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Resumen 
Subalternidad global, Exterioridad, e Independence Day 
Abstract 
Global Subalternity, Exteriority, and Independence 
Day 
El artículo analiza el trabajo de Laclau-Mouffe y Hardt-
Negri, probablemente los teóricos más influyentes del 
postmarxismo. El objetivo es mostrar que su trabajo no 
explica la exterioridad de la subalternidad en la globali-
zación y que, consecuentemente, no es es capaz de 
teorizar la dimensión geopolítica de la globalización. El 
artículo muestra que el trabajo de estos autores está 
todavía determinado por el marco epistemológico lin-
güístico del postestructuralismo (Lacan, Deleuze, Fou-
cault) y, como resultado, sigue estando definido por la 
geopolítica del estado (post)imperialista europeo. El 
artículo discute la película Independence Day para pro-
bar que las propuestas teóricas de estos autores han 
sido previamente cooptadas y movilizadas por el neoli-
beralismo global.  
 
The article analyzes the work of Laclau-Mouffe and 
Hardt-Negri, perhaps the most influential theorists of 
Postmarxism. The goal is to show that their work does 
not account for the exteriority of subalternity in glob-
alization and, thus, they are not able to theorize glob-
alization in its geopolitical dimension. The article 
shows that the work of these authors is still confined 
to and by the linguistic, epistemological framework of 
postestructuralism (Lacan, Deleuze, Foucault), and, as 
a result, remains defined and limited by the geopoli-
tics of the (post)imperialist European nation-state. 
The article discusses the film Independence Day to 
prove that the theoretical proposals of these authors 
have been already co-opted and deployed by global 
neoliberalism.  
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1) GENEALOGY OF POSTMARXISM 
 Over the last twenty years, two works, more than any other, have shaken 
and defied previous leftist thinking on politics: Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Em-
pire (2000)—perhaps with Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1987) as the 
holy ghost of this Marxist trinity. To the reader of theory, both books appear inscribed 
in a poststructuralist genealogy that stems from Althusser and Deleuze but also from 
other authors who do not have a direct Marxist affiliation, such as Lacan or Foucault. 
Thus, both works represent a continuation and reengagement in the Marxist attempt 
to rethink poststructuralism in conjunction with the other two major discourses that 
have challenged humanism: Nietzsche’s philosophy and Freud’s psychoanalysis. 
Furthermore, both books benefit from the thirty- or forty-year perspective gained by 
theory, after the events of 1968 and the ensuing global expansion of capitalism after 
1989.  
 My contention is that both works foreground capitalism as the ultimate in-
stance or reality and, as a result, they remain confined within the limits of traditional 
Marxism. More specifically, these works represent a continuation of the Marxist tradi-
tion of thinking capitalism from within the (post/imperialist, European) state:1 a class 
struggle taking place within each state with a goal towards its international expan-
sion. As a result, they do not transcend the framework of the state and, instead, end 
up redefining global politics—and politics in globalization—from the geopolitical 
standpoint of the (post)imperialist, European nation-state.  
                                                       
1 This coinage refers to England and France, and more marginally to Germany. No other European 
state is included in this formulation. 
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 Moreover, I defend that their reliance on language-derived, poststructuralist 
theories reinforces their state-bound theoretical limitation, for poststructuralism’s lin-
guistic and discursive approach ultimately relies on a state-derived, monological un-
derstanding of linguistic reality: language is always the one and only national lan-
guage of the (post)imperialist, European nation-state.  
 The most important effect and consequence of this geopolitical, theoretical 
limitation is the incapacity of these works to think subalternity and exteriority to/in 
global capitalism, which ultimately amounts to not being able to think the politics of 
globalization—and politics in globalization. Consequently, their work does not defy 
capitalism but rather confirms the political scenario that the inherent logic of capital-
ism—increased exploitation of human labor through geo-biopolitical expansion and 
commodification of difference—deploys internally to further its hegemony. In short, I 
would like to underscore the fact that these their work’s political and theoretical hori-
zon remains Europe and the (post)modern, (post)imperialist nation-state. As a result, 
their theories end up legitimizing, rather than challenging, capitalism’s global hegem-
ony and, more specifically, its neoliberal ideology, which continues to rely on the 
state.  
 Ultimately, my analysis contributes to the ongoing postcolonial (Said, 
Spivak, Mignolo, Beverley, Guha, Chakrabarty) and feminist (Haraway, Spivak, But-
ler) criticism of poststructuralism and its lack of geo-bio-political situatedness—which 
ultimately explains the latter’s lack of awareness towards subalternity and exteriority 
(to capitalism). My emphasis on these two political realities, subalternity and exteriori-
ty, aims at resituating geopolitically the works of Laclau-Mouffe and Hardt-Negri and, 
by doing so, also de-legitimizing capitalism’s globalist ideology—which their works 
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contribute to legitimize. The final aim of my critique is to develop a political utopian 
theory that will allow us to start thinking the aftermath of capitalism.2 
 Since my area of expertise is representation theory, rather than political or 
philosophical theory sensu stricto, I will rely on a historical analysis of the cultural rep-
resentation of otherness in modern imperialism and globalization and, more specifi-
cally, on a detailed analysis of the film Independence Day (Emmerich, 1996) to 
ground my analysis. The goal is to show that both political projects—Laclau-Mouffe’s 
and Hardt-Negri’s—have been already preempted and assimilated by the neoliberal 
ideology of global capitalism and some of its “ideological global apparatuses,” such 
as Hollywood—if you allow me the refashioned reference to Althusser’s theory of in-
terpellation.3 In the following, I will first discuss the work of these authors separately 
and highlight their geopolitical, yet, unconscious limitations. Then, I will explain the 
way these limitations derive from these author’s political reliance on the nationalist 
linguistics and epistemology supported by the (post)imperialist, European nation-
state. After the discussion of each work, I will present Independence Day in a larger 
historical context in order to demonstrate that global hegemonic representations al-
ready deploy the political strategies and articulations expounded by these authors.  
 In the case of Laclau and Mouffe, I will show that Independence Day is al-
ready a representation of a radical democratic articulation. Nevertheless, the film also 
                                                       
2 As well as the aftermath of “Terror.” Here Terror is understood as imperialist war and complements 
terrorism in their asymmetrical mirroring structure. 
3 It is important to begin by emphasizing the specificity of both books. They represent clear and dis-
tinct, almost opposite, genealogies of poststructuralist Marxist thinking—which some have termed 
“post-Marxism.” Laclau and Mouffe forgo any economic dynamic that might set the terms for revolution 
and instead emphasize the political necessity for the articulation of a radical democratic hegemony, 
which can encompass most forms of political dissidence to which capitalism gives rise (feminism, 
ecology, race struggles, etc.). Hardt and Negri, on the other hand, return to the core internal contradic-
tion of capitalism, as analyzed by Marx, and point out the political and utopian potential of this contra-
diction in its new globalized expansion by deploying three new complementary concepts: biopolitics, 
Empire, and multitude. In this sense, the two books appear to be almost antithetical: the former is his-
torical whereas the second is teleological. Yet, in a further analysis, they share the same discursive 
genealogy and political unconscious.  
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represents othered forms of subalternity, which are excluded from its radical, demo-
cratic articulation of hegemony—something that the work of Laclau and Mouffe can-
not think. By historicizing the representational strategy of Independence Day, I will 
emphasize that the exclusion of othered subalternity is a strategy that is present in 
literature since the rise of British capitalism and the gothic novel in the eighteenth 
century and, ultimately, constitutes the imperialist state as nation.  
 In the case of Hardt and Negri, I will show that Independence Day is the first 
global blockbuster and, as such global film, creates and sanctions forms of global 
spectatorship that are biopolitical. I will then historicize this form of biopolitical specta-
torship in the context of global war and spectacle, which consolidates with the first 
North American war against Iraq and its global coverage by CNN (1991). This histori-
cal analysis will demonstrate that the formation of a global, biopolitical spectatorship 
and, more generally, of global biopolitics, is precisely enabled by the exclusion of 
subjects that are subaltern. In short, I will defend that global capitalism legitimizes 
itself by creating a global subalternity that is defined by its exclusion from biopoli-
tics—something that the work of Hard and Negri cannot think. By historicizing the 
representational strategy of Independence Day, I will emphasize that the exclusion of 
othered subalternity is a strategy that is present in historiography since the rise of 
nationalism in the nineteenth century and, ultimately, constitutes the exteriority that 
defines the imperialist state as nation.  
2) LACLAU AND MOUFFE 
2.1 On the Persistence of the Nation-State in “Radical Democracy”  
 In their groundbreaking work, Laclau and Mouffe revise the tradition that 
spans from Marx and Rosa Luxemburg to Althusser. This revision allows them to re-
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define the three concepts on which they build their proposal for a radical democracy: 
the discursive openness of politics, hegemony, and antagonism.4 Therefore it is im-
portant to examine these three concepts in detail, before analyzing the way their pro-
posal leads them back, through the back door, to the (post)imperialist, European na-
tion-state.  
Because of their reliance on poststructuralist theories of discourse, 
Laclau and Mouffe underscore the fact that no political system is 
closed and, rather, its openness constitutes the exteriority to which 
the political field cannot give closure. As they explain: “no 
hegemonic logic can account for the totality of the social and 
constitute its center, for in that case a new suture would have been 
produced and the very concept of hegemony would have eliminated 
itself. The openness of the social is, thus, the precondition of every 
hegemonic practice” (142). 
 This poststructuralist approach to reality solves the problem of the constitu-
tive relationship between identity and politics. For Laclau and Mouffe, the interior and 
exterior of the social field as well as the political identities that constitute the latter 
become defined in differential terms: the openness of the social becomes its exteri-
ority and negative moment, from which the former is internally constituted and closed 
through difference: 
As a systematic structural ensemble, the relations are unable to 
absorb the identities; but as the identities are purely relational, this 
is but another way of saying that there is no identity which can be 
fully constituted… It is in this terrain, where neither a total interiority 
nor a total exteriority is possible, that the social is constituted. For 
the same reason that the social cannot be reduced to the interiority 
of a fixed system of differences, pure exteriority is also impossible. 
(111) 
 Yet it is important to emphasize that this negative exteriority is also relation-
al: it is constructed as the limit of the political field’s interiority, which cannot be fixed 
                                                       
4 The concept of “articulation” would be the forth key component of their theory. However, it is not 
necessary to revise this concept for my argumentation.  
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or closed, because, for Laclau and Mouffe, the nature of identity is relational and dif-
ferential.  
 From this approach to the political as open field, and following Gramsci, 
Laclau and Mouffe introduce the other two key concepts that structure their political 
discourse: antagonism and hegemony. Both terms explain the way the interiority of a 
political order is structured differentially. Antagonism is the difference that a given 
political order negates. As the authors state: “Antagonism as the negation of a given 
order is, quite simply, the limit of that order, and not the moment of a broader totality 
in relation to which the two poles of the antagonism would constitute differential—i.e. 
objective—partial instances” (126). In turn, they define hegemony as the discursive 
and ideological structure that upholds a given order, against which antagonism is dif-
ferentially structured as negation. As the authors state: “[H]egemony is… a political 
type of relation, a form, if one so whishes, of politics; but not a determinable location 
within a topography of the social” (139). The authors explain their theoretical debt to 
Gramsci’s concept of “historical bloc,” which they redefine discursively as hegemony: 
A social and political space relatively unified through the instituting 
of nodal points and the constitution of tendentially relational 
identities, is what Gramsci called a historical bloc. The type of link 
joining the different elements of the historical bloc—not unity in any 
form of historical a priori, but regularity in dispersion—coincides with 
our concept of discursive formation. Insofar as we consider the 
historical bloc from the point of view of the antagonistic terrain in 
which it is constituted, we will call it hegemonic formation. (136) 
 Once Laclau and Mouffe expound their theory of politics as a hegemony 
defined through antagonism in an open social field, they approach the new political 
reality of “advanced industrial societies” in the fourth and last chapter of their book. 
More specifically, they center on the emergence of the new social movements and 
conclude that: 
The unsatisfactory term ‘new social movements’ groups together a 
series of highly diverse struggles: urban, ecological, anti-
authoritarian, anti-institutional, feminist, anti-racist, ethnic, regional 
or that of sexual minorities… What interests us about these new 
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social movements, then, is not the idea of arbitrarily grouping them 
into a category opposed to that of class, but the novel role they play 
in articulating that rapid diffusion of social conflictuality to more and 
more numerous relations which is characteristic today of advanced 
industrial societies. (159-60) 
 Since they end their book with a reconsideration of the “new social move-
ments,” it is important to underscore that this is the one and only reality they address 
through their new redefinition of political openness, antagonism, and hegemony. Fol-
lowing mainstream Marxism, they first emphasize the totalizing effect of capitalism: 
[T]here is practically no domain of individual or collective life which escapes capitalist 
relations” (161). Then, they equate politics with the new social movements in ad-
vanced industrial societies and, as a result, they turn the identity of these groups into 
the ground in which their analysis of politics is proven and legitimized. Yet, the au-
thors do not explain that the “historical and political” reason for the formation of these 
new groups is precisely the development of late capitalism in postmodern societies—
as well as the ensuing spread of the neoliberal ideal of democracy. In other words, 
late capitalism in advanced, industrial societies becomes the center and justification 
of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, since the former encompasses and validates the polit-
ical field of the new social movements. Although the social movements might organ-
ize themselves antagonistically against or around capitalism, and, thus, might exceed 
the latter, Laclau and Mouffe present this excess as deriving from and relying on cap-
italism. In short capitalism continues to be the only and primary political horizon of 
antagonism for Laclau and Mouffe. There is no antagonism, in their discourse, which 
is political and is not determined by capitalism; there is no exteriority to capitalism in 
their work.  
 Consequently, capitalism becomes the political reality that denies and inval-
idates the initial openness of the social, which the authors posit as point of departure 
for their theory. Allow me to quote at length in order to illustrate capitalism’s tran-
scendental effect of closure in Laclau and Mouffe’s work: 
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The fact that these ‘new antagonisms’ are the expression of forms 
of resistance to the commodification, bureaucratization and 
increasing homogeneization of social life itself explains why they 
should frequently manifest themselves through a proliferation of 
particularisms, and crystallize into a demand for autonomy itself. It is 
also for this reason that there is an identifiable tendency towards the 
valorization of ‘differences’ and the creation of new identities which 
tend to privilege ‘cultural’ criteria (clothes, music, language, regional 
traditions, and so on)… For this reason many of these forms of 
resistance are made manifest not in the forms of collective 
struggles, but through an increasingly affirmed individualism… But 
in any case, and whatever the political orientation through which the 
antagonism crystallizes… the form of the antagonism as such is 
identical in all cases… Once again, we find ourselves confronting 
the division of social space. (164-65, my emphasis) 
 Once it is accepted that capitalism determines all social aspects, the former 
also becomes the origin and ultimate horizon of social antagonism. Thus, it is not a 
coincidence that antagonism is mostly articulated in cultural forms that affirm individ-
ualism and its identities, i.e. subjectivity in late-capitalist, first-world countries. As 
Laclau and Mouffe conclude in the above quote, “the form of the antagonism as such 
is identical in all cases.” But then capitalism is recentered as the open but ultimately 
all-encompassing formation that justifies all antagonisms, through commodification. 
As a result, capitalism becomes the closure of the political field and its transcenden-
tal subject. In turn, this political field, because of its capitalist closure, always requires 
a modern and individualistic understanding of the subject, which only applies to first-
world societies.  
 After underlining the ultimate centrality of capitalism and the politics that its 
subjectivity —first-world individualism— requires, Laclau and Mouffe emphasize the 
importance of democracy in a way that cannot be separated from its neoliberal ver-
sion: “[T]hus far we have presented the emergence of new antagonisms and political 
subjects as linked to the expansion and generalization of the democratic revolution” 
(166). Consequently, they conclude their book by asserting that the political goal of 
the Left “should consist of locating itself fully in the field of the democratic revolution 
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and expanding the chains of equivalents between the different struggles against op-
pression. The task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ide-
ology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and 
plural democracy” (176). As long as political struggle and democratic expansion are 
situated within capitalism and the latter becomes their closed and transcendental 
horizon, radical and neoliberal democracies cannot be differentiated. Ultimately, radi-
cal democracy becomes just another justification for the internal logic of late capital-
ism.5 
2.2 Discourse and National Language 
 The reason for finally closing the political field and conflating it with capital-
ism —its transcendental justification— relies on Laclau and Mouffe’s reliance on 
poststructuralism’s take on discourse and language. The political model of these au-
                                                       
5 After this article was finished, Laclau published his second major work, On Populist Reason (2005). 
Given the length of the article, I will not make references to his earlier New Reflections on the Revolu-
tion of Our Time, for I consider it a prelude and a continuation of his (their) Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy (Reflections is an essay collection containing material older and newer than Hegemony). In 
the following notes, I will concentrate on his later On Populist Reason, which does mark a significant 
revision of his (their) earlier theory. 
By shifting his attention from radical democracy to populism, he has precisely attempted to address 
the shortcoming of his first work, written with Chantal Mouffe. Populism is a more general form of poli-
tics, which encompasses democratic and non-democratic forms of politics and spans beyond the nar-
row history of new-social-movement politics.  
Furthermore, he pays special attention to the issue of “heterogeneity:” the political subjects left outside 
the political discourse of hegemony and antagonism. He implicitly assumes the “simplifying” nature of 
his (their) earlier proposal for radical democracy when he adds:  
We must now move on to the second simplifying assumption implicit in our model of empty 
signifiers —one which we must now eliminate. We have assumed so far that every unfulfilled 
demand can incorporate itself in the equivalential chain that is constitutive of the popular 
camp. Is this, however, a justified assumption? Two minutes of reflection are enough to con-
clude that it is not. (139) 
However, his (their) previous work did conclude that it was. Thus, Laclau defines now heterogeneity 
as the outside of the equivalential chain: “the kind of outside that I am now discussing presupposes 
exteriority not just to something within a space of representation, but to the space of representation as 
such. I will call this type of exteriority social heterogeneity” (140). 
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thors derives from the poststructuralist idea that a political field is a single discursive 
structure of differences. That is to say, a political field can be understood as a single 
discursive reality, only if the Saussurean definition of language is accepted: a single 
structure of differences. Quoting Saussure and Benveniste, they conclude: “in an ar-
ticulated discursive totality, where every element occupies a differential position—in 
our terminology, where every element has been reduced to a moment of that totality 
—all identity is relational and all relations have a necessary character” (106). As I will 
explain later, this (post)structuralist and Saussurean approach to politics ultimately 
relies on a nationalist understanding of language as state reality.6 
 It is important to analyze the way in which a discursive understanding of 
politics leads to the capitalist closure of the political field in Laclau and Mouffe’s theo-
ry. As the following quote makes clear, their definition of the political is discursive: 
A discursive structure is not a merely ‘cognitive’ or ‘contemplative’ 
entity: it is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes 
social relations. We can thus talk of a growing complexity and 
fragmentation of advanced industrial societies —not in the sense 
                                                       
6 In his latest work, On Populist Reason, Laclau continues to assume the Saussurean structuralist 
postulates as the departure point to elaborate his theory of populism (25, 68). However, his attempt to 
incorporate, following Joan Copjec’s work, the psychoanalytical theory of drive and affect, although 
necessary, fails in the last instance, because Laclau’s ontological approach to politics as discourse is 
void of any libidinal apparatus. Only at one point does he explain the libidinal expansion of his discur-
sive model:  
The different signifying operations to which I have referred so far can explain the forms the in-
vestment takes, but not the force in which the investment consists. It is clear, however, that if 
an entity becomes the object of an investment —as in being in love, or in hatred— the invest-
ment belongs necessarily to the order of affect. It is this affective dimension that I now have to 
bring into the picture… Affect is not something which exists on its own, independently of lan-
guage; it constitutes itself only through the differential cathexes of a signifying chain… So we 
can conclude that any social whole results from an indissociable articulation between signi-
fying and affective dimensions. (110-11) 
At no point does Laclau explain where “force” comes from in his elaboration, nor does he elaborate 
the effects of affect in populism. As a result, the issue of the leader or caudillo, for example, so present 
in many populist politics, remains fully unexplained in his work. In short, the libidinal apparatus that he 
attempts to incorporate to his basic discursive approach remains an additive that, ultimately, reinforces 
the lack of libidinal politics of his work. Laclau’s work remains anchored in a discursive, linguistic ap-
proach to politics—an approach that, as I will explain later, is grounded on the (post)imperialist, Euro-
pean nation-state.  
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that, sub specie aeternitatis, they are more complex than earlier 
societies; but in the sense that they are constituted around a 
fundamental asymmetry. This is the asymmetry existing between a 
growing proliferation of differences—a surplus of meaning of ‘the 
social’—and the difficulties encountered by any discourse 
attempting to fix those differences as moments of a stable 
articulatory structure. (96, my emphasis) 
 The importance of the above quote lies on the fact that it is the only in-
stance in which the authors justify their choice of “discourse” as epistemological and 
ontological ground for their theory. Although in their work they depart from an ex-
haustive analysis of Marxist political theory, from Luxemburg to Althusser, and they 
emphasize their reliance on Gramsci, the first three chapters of the book do not justi-
fy the recourse to “discourse” to found their political analysis. Only the above refer-
ence hints tangentially to the relation between discourse, on the one hand, and the 
“growing proliferation of differences” and “surplus of meaning of ‘the social’” in ad-
vanced industrial societies, on the other. Furthermore, the use of ‘discourse,’ to talk 
about reality and articulatory practices (ideology), renders the use of such term even 
more conflictive.  
 At no point does the work of Laclau and Mouffe thoroughly reflect on the 
consequences of universalizing a “discursive model,” which, as they add, is predomi-
nant only in advanced industrial societies. After the introductory clarification men-
tioned above, their book moves to universalize their claims about discursivity, as in 
the following definition: “we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation 
among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory 
practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call 
discourse” (105). Hence, they simply proceed to universalize a discursive approach 
and conclude that the latter accounts for “social relations” in general. In other words, 
discourse, as a singular structure of differences, is “where the social is constituted:” 
The main consequence of a break with the discursive/extra-
discursive dichotomy is the abandonment of the thought/reality 
opposition, and hence a major enlargement of the field of those 
categories which can account for social relations. Synonymy, 
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metonymy, metaphor are not forms of thought that add a second 
sense to a primary, constitutive literality of social relations; instead, 
they are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is 
constituted. (110) 
 The only reason Laclau and Mouffe give for the universalization of a discur-
sive approach is that such an approach solves the chronic problem that has plagued 
Marxist theory to this day, namely, the irreconcilable dichotomy between the political 
and the economic (or more broadly speaking, base and superstructure). As they con-
clude, “far from being consolidated, the separation between the economic and the 
political is hereby eliminated. For, a reading in socialist terms of immediate economic 
struggles discursively articulates the political and the economic, and thus does away 
with the exteriority existing between the two” (120). Therefore, the only clear reason 
argued in favor of a unifying discursive approach has to do with the history of Marx-
ism itself. Yet, as I demonstrate in the following, a discursive approach does not 
solve but reifies Marxism’s problems in new ways. 
 The fact that Laclau and Mouffe approach the political field and its identitar-
ian open structure as discourse, on the one hand, and the fact that late capitalism 
remains the closed and transcendental horizon of their political theory, on the other, 
are not contradictory theoretical developments. They respond to one and same politi-
cal logic: a monologic and unifying reason that has a very specific geopolitical loca-
tion. These two seemingly contradictory theoretical developments can be observed in 
European societies where the field of politics is the (post)imperialist, capitalist nation-
state. In these societies, the state becomes the transcendental horizon of politics, 
which eliminates any exteriority (the colony, the postcolony, illegal immigrants, etc.) 
and, at the same time, guarantees that the proliferation of social identities be ex-
pressed in an open way through language, since language always represents a na-
tional language, that is, the language of the state and its apparatuses of interpella-
tion. A national language such as French, English, or German, guarantees that all 
political differences become equally political while remaining interior to the state---i.e. 
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that the Saussurean linguistic structure becomes political. At a simple linguistic level, 
several non-national languages and dialects within a single state would shatter the 
idea of a single political space, a single public sphere. For example, the linguistic 
presence of Basque, Romani, or Arabic in France and Spain in the 2000s points to 
more complex political realities that transcend, are exterior, to the state and to any 
radical democratic practice limited to the citizenship (migration, postcolonialism, ter-
rorism, nomadism, religion, etc.).7  
 Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive openness does not transcend the 
state but, rather, further legitimizes the latter’s interiority as the single, unchallengea-
ble horizon of politics. Any differential proliferation of identities and social move-
ments, as long as they are theorized and analyzed as open discourse, do not chal-
lenge the state and its political interiority. The state remains the capitalist, transcen-
dental horizon of politics, thanks to its internal, discursive structure, which is ultimate-
ly guaranteed by its national language. In short, linguistic openness equals capitalist 
closeness in the context of the (post)imperialist, European nation-state, which ulti-
mately also portends both traditional Marxism and poststructuralism throughout the 
twentieth century.  
2.3 Independence Day as Radical, Democratic Hegemony 
 The following history of representation of otherness, leading to the specific 
analysis of Independence Day, would like to exemplify and concretize the fact that 
the radical, democratic hegemony proposed by Laclau and Mouffe actually legitimiz-
es the field of antagonisms created by capitalism within the (post)imperialist, Europe-
an nation-state. Moreover, I want to demonstrate that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory 
                                                       
7 In last instance, non-Christian religions such as Muslim, Jewish or pagan, are exterior to states such 
as France, Spain or Germany, which, even though they present different constitutional provisions of 
inclusion or exclusion, so far they have only made room for Christian religions. 
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does no account for subalternity’s exteriority vis-à-vis the (post)imperialist, European 
nation-state, which, in the history of Western representations of otherness, is equat-
ed with the alien, the ghost, and the vampire, i.e. with an unrepresentable and re-
pressed form of otherness defined by its uncanny return. These two authors do not 
consider that capitalism reorganizes forms of subalternity that do not exist—their 
identity is not defined—in an antagonistic position vis-à-vis different hegemonies de-
fining the (post)imperialist, European nation-state. Moreover, they cannot explain the 
fact that these forms of subalternity are exterior to the capitalist state: they precede 
capitalism historically and, in theory, could survive it as well. In short, Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory is only applicable to “advanced industrial societies” qua 
(post)imperialist nation-states and, more specifically, to any politics internal to such 
political institutions—the new social movements. Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe’s 
theory fails to grasp the radically different geopolitical organization of the world in 
globalization—which amounts to underscoring the anachronistic nature of their theo-
ry. Ultimately it is a modern European theory, epistemologically limited by linguistic 
nationalism, which, therefore, cannot explain a post-modern-colonial-national global 
reality. 
 In the following, I will sketch a history of the representation of otherness in 
modernity, which traces different forms of otherness, from the gothic novel in the 
eighteenth century to the filmic representation of the alien in contemporary Holly-
wood. The purpose of this history is to emphasize the fact that capitalism evolves 
historically in Europe by othering subjects which sometimes are incorporated (or in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s language articulated hegemonically) within the (post)imperialist, 
European nation-state, but oftentimes are exteriorized, expelled, outside the capitalist 
nation-state, in a beyond that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory posits, but cannot theorize 
as politically and historically existent. Ultimately, incorporating and externalizing oth-
erness are two complementary representational strategies, which constitute capital-
ism’s cultural logic, but Laclau and Mouffe’s work cannot think in their complemen-
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tariness—thus legitimizing instead the capitalist state and its interiority as the tran-
scendental horizon of politics. 
 As the work of several critics of the gothic novel (Backus, Ellis, Sedgwick) 
makes clear, the gothic novel of the late eighteenth century represents most of the 
othered groups and subjects that modernity and the bourgeoisie incorporate to or 
exclude from their imperialist, national project: the ancient regime and its different 
political subjects (nobility and peasantry), older modern empires (Spain) and eco-
nomic centers (Italy), colonial spaces (Ireland, the West Indies), older or alternative 
forms of sexuality, etc. In this way, by othering all these non-related subject positions 
and groups, the gothic novel manages to re-center the emerging, male, British, bour-
geois subject as hegemonic. Yet, and following Laclau and Mouffe’s terminology, on-
ly certain forms of otherness are articulated (incorporated as other) in the new hege-
monic articulation of the British bourgeois subject, whereas other forms of otherness 
are excluded, repressed, or pushed to the unthinkable openness of the political field 
that Laclau and Mouffe posit but cannot theorize as space of politics. This would be 
the space of the repressed, the uncanny (Freud), or the Real (Lacan). The gothic 
novel, specifically, highlights the difficulty and instability of this process of incorporat-
ing and exteriorizing different forms of otherness. While most gothic characters expe-
rience the impossibility of leaving the enclosed space in which they are captives, thus 
asserting the formation of a new national space, they also show all the forms of oth-
erness that haunt this new, yet anguishing, space articulated by the new bourgeois 
hegemonic subject. For example, the terror experienced by the hero in gothic novels 
such as Ann Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794) or The Italian (1796), is 
triggered by uncanny and evil Italian characters associated with the Inquisition. In 
many other novels, the same character is Spanish (most notably, Matthew Lewis’s 
The Monk, 1795). 
 Once the study of the gothic novel is connected to that of the historical nov-
el, via Lukàcs’s study of Walter Scott’s work, we can redefine what this critic calls the 
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“middle-of-the-road hero” (37) in its new historicity: this hero is the hegemonic repre-
sentation articulated through an empty referent that permits to antagonize, displace, 
and other some of the subjects and groups described above. In short, the middle-of-
the-road hero is simply the articulation, through an empty referent, of the antagonism 
that arises between the new bourgeoisie and the subject positions mentioned above. 
In this respect, and as far as it is an empty referent, the middle-of-the-road hero is a 
negative representation defined differentially by opposition to the other subjects. Yet, 
and unlike in the gothic novel, the new social space of the bourgeoisie is clearly de-
fined. As a result, the historical novel can contemplate certain forms of otherness, 
through nostalgia, as historical realities—as historical others: Scottish highlanders, 
Saxon knights, etc. However, only certain traits and characteristic of the othered sub-
jects are incorporated (articulated) by the new bourgeois subject. Those internalized 
characteristics are represented as separated—othered—from their original subjects 
and, yet, they remain ultimately connected to the latter—or as Laclau and Mouffe 
would defend, they are hegemonically articulated as part of the equivalential chain. 
At the same time, many othered characteristics/subjects, instead of being incorpo-
rated, are expelled and repressed—to the outside of the political field or discourse. 
For example and in the case of Scott’s Ivanhoe (1819), the hero occupies the posi-
tion of national subject by marrying Rowena, a woman from the rival ethnic group, 
the Normans, while paying farewell to the other woman who loves him, Rebecca, a 
Jewish woman who, at the end of the novel, migrates to Spain. At this point, Spain is 
presented as a decadent empire both othered and expelled from the modern Euro-
pean imaginary through the black legend—hence the reference to Jews in Spain. 
Moreover, this country is moved to the non-coeval realm of the (Medieval) Orient 
through the new incipient discourse of Orientalism. In short, some differences are 
articulated as national, while others are exteriorized as exotic. Yet, both acts of in-
corporation and exteriorization are necessary to the representation and articulation of 
a hegemonic subject and discourse.  
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 This analysis allows us to understand two crucial elements in the history of 
the representation of the other in Europe. On the one hand, the gothic and historical 
novels give a new representation of modernity altogether (geopolitical, sexual, histor-
ical, economic…) whereby Britain and its new hegemonic class are recentered in dif-
ferential opposition to some subject positions, on the one hand, and in repressing 
opposition to yet other subject positions, on the other. This differential and hegemon-
ic construction allows us to see that several subject positions othered by the gothic 
and historical novels are sometimes included (articulated) but, other times, excluded 
or expelled from the new hegemonic representation of the British bourgeoisie. In 
Laclau and Mouffe’s terminology they are pushed to the beyond of the antagonistic 
articulation of bourgeois, national hegemony. Yet, the forms of otherness that are 
excluded have previous historical existence and, although they become subaltern 
under the new British hegemony, they continue to occupy a historical position, albeit 
such a historical position is one of exteriority.  
 The newly othered and exteriorized position of these subaltern subjects 
functions according to the logic that, after Freud, has been defined as “the return of 
the repressed” or “the uncanny.” In order to continue with Spanish examples, the un-
canny return of the repressed is exemplified by the romantic myth of Don Juan, popu-
larized by Zorrilla. Don Juan plunders sexually—rather than economically—the old 
dominions of Spanish imperialism in Europe and, after he is condemned and dragged 
to hell because of his defiance of Spain’s actual geopolitical situation—a post-
imperialist decadent state represented by the father of Doña Inés—he is rescued by 
his last conquest and wife-to-be, Doña Inés. She is the embodiment of a new post-
imperialist national domestic ideal of Spain, which Don Juan rejects when it is pre-
sented in political terms (Doña Inés’s father) rather than in sexual ones (Doña Inés). 
Yet, this uncanny return of imperial Spain haunts the British imaginary (from Byron to 
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Bernard Shaw) and manages to survive in the new Anglo-American imaginary of con-
temporary USA8 under newly refashioned “Hispanic” figures, such as Antonio Ban-
deras, who now also stands for Latin America’s subaltern position in the North Amer-
ican global imaginary (Gabilondo “Antonio Banderas”). In short, the subaltern, from 
its othered external position, retains a history that is exterior to the development of 
capitalism by occupying the uncanny position of “the returning repressed other.” 
 Yet, when the British Empire expands its dominion to the non-European 
colonial world and develops new strategies both to represent and to other the coloni-
al subject—mainly Orientalism—subjects such as the working class, the homosexual, 
and the New Woman are othered through new genres such as science fiction, the 
detective story, or the vampire novel. In this way, the new British modernist subject, 
as the empty referent of hegemony, is again redefined (articulated) differentially by 
opposition to all those subject positions. Yet as the Irish cases of Oscar Wilde (The 
Picture of Dorian Gray) and Bram Stoker (Dracula) exemplify, certain othered posi-
tions are externalized (beyond the field of antagonism differentially articulated by 
bourgeois, British hegemony) and, thus, they return under the othered representation 
of the uncanny. In the case of Dracula, for example, the vampire as external other 
stands for the Orient, the ancient regime, Ireland, the dehumanizing effects of capital-
ism, and “perverse” forms of sexuality and gender. Dracula represents, in the felici-
tous sentence of Stephen Arata, “reversed colonialism,” i.e., the uncanny return of 
the subaltern colonial. This return cannot be reduced to any internal logic of capital-
ism and, moreover, this is precisely the reason why the colonial subaltern is so un-
canny in Dracula. 
 The return of the exterior, subaltern other, such as the vampire, does not go 
away with the decline of the British Empire. Rather, those subaltern positions, as well 
                                                       
8 Now, vis-à-vis the USA, Britain takes the position occupied by Spain in the nineteenth century, with 
new Don Juans such as James Bond. 
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as newer ones, reappear under the more recent imperialist discourse of North Ameri-
can globalization at the end of the twentieth century. In that way, the figure of the 
vampire does not disappear altogether, but rather “returns” in North American repre-
sentations, as in the case of the aliens in Independence Day (1996). It is not too diffi-
cult to retrace the genealogy of the new, North American alien to that of the Victorian 
vampire. The “new vampire,” the alien, which I will henceforth call “the global vam-
pire,” comes from without the limits of the global, North American empire; it has come 
once before (the film depicts the incidents of Roswell in the 1950s as the first en-
counter with the same aliens) and, thus, its second return is uncanny; it is a superior 
technological being; it is a more powerful capitalist (its capital derives from pillage); it 
is sexually perverse (the metaphors of rape and anal sexuality run through the film); it 
is economically global (it does not operate within the structures of the nation-state 
but, rather, duplicates the migrant logic of multinationals and immigrants from the 
Third World); finally it is a politically superior agent for it incorporates equality and 
hierarchy within one single political structure (it is both neoliberal-democratic and so-
cialist, since it has integrated both political forms under a cybernetic, social structure). 
In short, the alien represents the othered forms of the Cold War and contemporary 
globalization, which the USA needs in order to represent (articulate) itself as the 
hegemonic subject in globalization.  
 At the same time, Independence Day incorporates the project of a radical 
democracy: every form of “new-social-movement politics,” highlighted by Laclau and 
Mouffe, is articulated as part of a new global, democratic, North American hegemony. 
In other words, the film also shows forms of otherness that are incorporated into the 
global, North American hegemony through antagonism: they are internal others. The 
film presents a female vice-president, an African-American war hero, an ecologically-
sound Jewish scientist, and a sensitive, WASPish president who resists partisan poli-
tics and rises to the occasion by embodying “true” world leadership. In this way, most 
new social movements have a representation and position in the film. Each repre-
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sented position is defined by an individual character and, thus, this radical democrat-
ic hegemony is pitted as a national, North American discourse. In short, the film re-
sponds to the individualistic political organization that Laclau and Mouffe posit for the 
new social movements. As a result, every subject position resulting from this new 
democratic antagonism is articulated individualistically as both North American and 
global. Every other political subject position is othered and expelled as alien: as non-
individual, non-democratic, non-North American, and non-global.9 For example, after 
the aliens are vanquished by three individual heroes, the 4th of July becomes the 
global day of independence celebrated by the masses all over the world. Moreover, 
the fact that this film turned an African-American actor (Will Smith) into a very com-
mercial and successful actor capable of acting and carrying a global blockbuster, for 
the first time, shows the ultimate power of such hegemony.10 
 Yet, the new representation of the external other or global vampire reveals 
the contradictions of a new radical, democratic, capitalist, North American hegemo-
ny—which, the theory of Mouffe and Laclau cannot explain. Even when the new de-
ployment of democratic hegemony reaches a global level and, thus, affects all hu-
mans, capitalism manages to represent forms of otherness that are exterior to hu-
mankind (a global alien) and, by doing so, is also able to create an external limit: 
North America and its global hegemony versus an exterior subaltern (“the Third 
World,” old socialist regimes, alternative sexualities, etc.). In other words, it does not 
matter how radical the democratic hegemonic discourse is; capitalism can always 
                                                       
9 It is most revealing that, in order to move from a national to a global hegemony, gender and sex dif-
ferences must be eliminated (the female vice-president dies and the overt homosexual colleague is 
obliterated too) and the resulting masculine homosocial difference (ethnic and racial) is celebrated 
instead as global.  
10 Needless to say, serious and thorough sociological research must be undertaken in order to com-
plete the complicated and contradictory nature of any hegemonic discourse and interpellation. The 
theatre in which I saw the premier of Independence Day was located in downtown Philadelphia in an 
area that was predominantly non-white. The audiences rooted for the aliens rather than for the North 
American heroes.  
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redeploy it externally (aliens). In this way, capitalism always ends up creating an ex-
ternal limit that expels the subaltern subject and reduces politics to the new internal 
boundary of North American imperialism (the first world, Europe, heterosexuality, 
homosociality, etc.).  
 Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the exteriority articulated by Hol-
lywood, through the representation of the global vampire, always encompasses 
forms of subalternity that are not necessarily part of the antagonism articulated by 
North American hegemony. Independence Day is very illustrative of this fact. When 
the antagonism between humankind and aliens escalates to full-blown war, the film 
only represents the USA and, peripherally, its first-world allies. Therefore the viewer 
is cinematically forced to adopt the hegemonic point of view of the North Americans 
(and its first-world allies) in order to dis-identify with the aliens. Yet the fact that there 
is no third cinematic position of identification (only North American/first world or al-
ien), creates the cinematic and ideological effect of equating every non-North Ameri-
can (or non-first-world) subject position with the aliens, that is, with the uncanny other 
of the USA. Thus, the non-North American (non-first-world) viewer him/herself, 
through the viewing of the film, alienates or exteriorizes him/herself. That is, his/her 
position becomes subaltern or repressed vis-à-vis the new North American-global 
hegemony.  
 Moreover, after the war is won and aliens are defeated, the film cuts to sev-
eral locations throughout the world and, for the first time, images of the southern 
hemisphere are shown, most tellingly, Africa. The Masai tribe shown in a short se-
quence works as the repressed subaltern position that comes at the end of the film to 
unsuccessfully legitimize the new global antagonism generated by the cinematic, 
North American hegemony. At the beginning of the film, different images make clear 
that the aliens are not attacking Africa, for there are no vital interests there. Yet, at 
the end of the film, at least one alien ship falls on African ground, thus explaining the 
representational inconsistency, redundancy, and excess of Africa in the film. In short, 
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the subaltern excess and redundancy of the Masai tribe at the end of the film is a 
noise or “meaningless” representation that, rather than negating the new global North 
American hegemony, upholds it and gives meaning to it.  
 Similarly, the film presents a very interesting secondary character: a sup-
posedly white, North American father, whose children are, nevertheless, either Latino 
or Native American—this indeterminacy is another sign of the othered status of both 
subject positions. The film’s necessity to present this ethnicity as well as its represen-
tational inability to incorporate this ethnic difference to the new global North American 
hegemony, points to the fact that the Native-American and Latino positions are simi-
lar to those of the Masai tribe. They become the representational stain that appears 
but cannot be symbolized or discursively articulated. As a result, the Native-American 
and Latino positions become exterior to the new global USA and, thus, are moved to 
the representational field of the alien. In the film, the white father joins the aliens by 
blowing himself up; as a result, his children become “fatherless,” in a film about the 
new “founding fathers” of a global nation.  
 Yet these very subaltern positions, excessive and exterior, must be res-
cued, for they point to an exteriority that capitalism creates in order to legitimize itself 
as hegemonic through internal political antagonisms.11 Thus, my analysis of Inde-
pendence Day would like to emphasize the fact that the new proposal for a demo-
cratic, radical hegemony proposed by Laclau and Mouffe is already being used, at 
the ideological level, by global capitalism in order to legitimize a new form of “radical, 
                                                       
11 Although Laclau and Mouffe wrote their book in 1985, that is, before the fall of the Berlin Wall or the 
Gulf War of 1991, the authors still insist in 2000, in the preface to the second edition, on the validity of 
their theory: 
Given the magnitude of these epochal changes, we were surprised, in going through the pa-
ges of this not-so-recent book again, at how little we have to put into question the intellectual 
and political perspective developed therein. Most of what has happened since then has clo-
sely followed the pattern suggested in our book, and those issues which were central to our 
concerns at that moment have become ever more prominent in contemporary discussions. 
(vii, my emphasis) 
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democratic, global politics,” which ultimately functions as the empty referent for a 
North American hegemony. 
 My critique of Laclau and Mouffe would like to underscore the fact that, only 
in the unconscious political horizon of the (post)imperialist, European nation-state, do 
all the forms of otherness produced by capitalism coincide with a democratic political 
field—all otherness is included; the only other not included remains the classical 
Marxist lumpenproletariat. In this way, the resulting internal antagonisms can be 
turned, through a chain of equivalents, into a radical, democratic hegemony whose 
openness can be endlessly expanded without questioning the (post)imperialist, Eu-
ropean nation-state as political horizon. Yet, the ever expanding openness that de-
fines the correspondence between the antagonisms created by the capitalist state 
and their democratic organization ceases outside the (post)imperialist, European na-
tion-state. The large masses of subalterns are continuously exteriorized and pushed 
outside to an ever-expanding, non-democratic, uncanny exterior. Any democratic he-
gemony, including its most radical version, is always bound to generate subalternity 
as its open exterior, if the geopolitical location of such radical, democratic, hegemon-
ic theory is not questioned. I am referring to the (post)imperialist, European nation-
state and the discursive differential interiority that the state’s national language and 
apparatuses guarantee. 
 It is not a coincidence that the Subaltern Group Studies in India, from which 
most thinking on subalternity derives (and rediscovers Gramsci), departs precisely 
from the disintegration of the nationalist project in postcolonial India. As Ranajit 
Guha, the founder of the group, states, one of the most important assumptions of the 
Subaltern Studies Group was precisely “the failure of the Indian bourgeoisie to speak 
for the nation. There were vast areas in the life and consciousness of the people 
which were never integrated into their hegemony” (xv). The historical revision of that 
exteriority generated by Indian nationalism allows this group to elaborate a theory of 
subalternity that does not reinscribe the latter within the nation. Similarly, Gayatri 
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Spivak, reflecting on the ways in which postructuralist theories (Deleuze/Foucault) 
approach the (post)colonial other, denounces the European transparency that allows 
these theories to erase the subaltern other. As she concludes: “On the French scene, 
there is a shuffling of signifiers: ‘the unconscious’ or ‘the-subject-in-oppression’ clan-
destinely fills the space of ‘the pure form of consciousness…’ Within the effaced itin-
erary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual difference is doubly effaced” (274). 
Laclau and Mouffe’s work represents another form of ‘the subject-in-oppression’ as 
‘pure form of consciousness,’ which erases any form of subalternity that does not 
reflect the pure form of consciousness that legitimizes the subject of the 
(post)imperialist, European nation-state.12  
                                                       
12 In his latest work, On Populist Reason, Laclau attempts to rescue the exteriority of subalternity by 
resorting to the idea of “heterogeneity” as the outside to any political field, of which populism is the 
most basic and general form. In order to do so, he resorts to the Marxist concept of lumpenproletariat, 
as theorized by Peter Stallybrass.  
Laclau begins by positing the exteriority of the lumpenproletariat as its condition of existence: “So the 
character of pure outsider of the lumpenproletariat, its expulsion from the field of historicity, is the very 
condition of possibility of a pure interiority, of a history with a coherent structure” (144). Laclau empha-
sizes the importance of this category for it transcends its narrow historical description in classical 
Marxism: “For if that feature [exteriority] applies to sectors wider than the lazzaroni [poor, destitute], its 
global effects would also be wider, and would threaten the internal coherence of the ‘historical’ world” 
(144). He even discards a negative, dialectical exteriority for the lumpenproletariat (or for its new theo-
rization “heterogeneity”): “That is why heterogeneity is constitutive: it cannot be transcended by any 
kind of dialectical reversal” (148).  
Yet, Laclau ends up positing the lumpenproletariat, as the interior that guarantees the antagonism of a 
populist hegemony. Laclau explains: “The opaqueness of an irretrievable ‘outside’ will always tarnish 
the very categories that define the ‘inside’. To return to our previous example: any kind of underdog, 
even in the extreme and purely hypothetical case in which it is exclusively a class defined by its loca-
tion within the relations of production, has to have something of the nature of the lumpenproletariat if it 
is going to be an antagonistic subject” (152). Thus, Laclau concludes that “the political game” will take 
place between “the homogeneous and the heterogeneous or, in our example, between the proletariat 
and the lumpenproletariat” (153). In that way, heterogeneity only becomes the limit of homogeneity 
and, thus, every political subject is heterogeneous only in so far as it limits the interiority of the political 
field. As a result, every populist subject becomes exterior for Laclau: “The ‘people’ will always be 
something more than the pure opposite of power. There is a Real of the ‘people’ which resists symbol-
ic integration” (152). Once every form of exteriority is assimilated as already part of any populist an-
tagonism, Laclau moves to theorize exclusively the interiority in which populist antagonism and he-
gemony are articulated. In short, he does not theorize the politics of both the limit and the outside, 
which are occupied by subalternity. This is what Spivak calls “the-subject-on-oppression” filling the 
space of “the pure form of consciousness.” 
Furthermore, he does not explore the violence and repression that constitutes the subaltern as exteri-
or. Therefore subalternity is reduced to the condition of the non-political limit upon which to elaborate 
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 Furthermore, subalternity resorts sometimes to non-democratic means of 
politics—as in the case of many fundamentalisms. In short, Laclau and Mouffe’s the-
ory cannot account for subalternity’s historical exteriority, let alone subaltern politics, 
which also includes violence.13 In psychoanalytical terms, one could sum up this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the politics of populism and populist hegemony. The final implication is that any form of subalternity 
that is not the limit of a populist antagonism and hegemony is once again eliminated by Laclau and 
banished into an unthinkable outside. Every outside is postulated as contributing to the limit of populist 
antagonism, so that every exteriority becomes a political subject with the possibility of creating this 
limit. In short, every subaltern subject is incorporated within the politics of populism; there is no histori-
cal or political exteriority to populist politics for Laclau. Every subaltern subject becomes visible and 
interior as limit. This generalization of “subalternity as limit” posits every subaltern subject as a political 
subject of populist politics, so that every subaltern subject becomes “transparent” as limit to Laclau.  
This new political transparency is simply an extended version of the new-social-movement politics that 
Laclau and Mouffe postulated in their earlier work. The unconscious paradigm from which to think the 
space of heterogeneous, populist politics as a transparent and accessible political field remains the 
(post)imperialist nation-state. Laclau does not theorize the violence and repression that keeps the 
subaltern outside. Ultimately, Laclau’s theorization of the Real, as I will explain in the following two 
endnotes, fails to grasp the violence involved in the traumatic attempt to keep the Real outside the 
symbolic order---and thus the violence of every (post)imperialist, European nation-state. 
Another way to trace the (post)nationalist, European, national genealogy of Laclau’s new definition of 
heterogeneity and populism is to look at the empirical material he analyzes. The majority of examples 
are circumscribed to Eastern Europe, Europe (Italy and France), the USA and Argentina (a nation-
state defined by its “European” social profile: middle-class hegemony and lack of major social groups 
defined by race, unlike, say, Bolivia, Mexico, or Peru). Turkey could be named as the only exception, 
although what he studies is precisely Turkey’s modernization (208-14). All these examples follow the 
pattern of the European, (post)imperialist nation-state. Most tellingly, when discussing the North Amer-
ican, populist movement known as The People’s Party (201-08), issues of race and gender remain 
exterior to the discussion (204). Furthermore, all the populist movements he analyzes are framed with-
in the structure of the nation-state. No populist movement organized around an empty signifier involv-
ing race, gender or sexuality is analyzed.  
Similarly, Laclau’s discussion of the theoretical formation of the concept of “crowd” at the end of the 
19th century, from Le Bon to Freud (21-64) is circumscribed to Europe, although this is the height of 
European imperialism and thus the “largest crowds” were actually located on the colonial field.  
Finally, when dealing with globalization, Laclau does not account for the paradoxical situation that 
arises from his analysis: following his model, we would have to conclude that “there are hegemonies 
within hegemonies.” That is, neoliberalism articulates national hegemonies within each country, which 
nevertheless respond to the global hegemony of the USA. When analyzing globalization, one could 
surmise that Laclau’s model yields a very interesting paradoxical conclusion: there is no room for 
global populism, since any form of hegemonic populism, so far, remains confined to the borders of the 
nation-state. Furthermore, Muslim radicalism would be the closest thing to a global populist move-
ment; yet Laclau does not study it. 
13 Similarly, in the events of 9-11, the suicide of the terrorists piloting the plains that crashed in the 
World Trade Center cannot simply be explained as a capitalist contradiction and antagonism, internal 
to capitalism. The fact that they were willing to commit suicide and, thus, take themselves out of the 
sphere of capitalist influence and North American anti-terrorist retaliation cannot simply be accounted 
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shortcoming by stating that Laclau and Mouffe do not differentiate the other (with a 
small “o”) from the Thing, in their elaboration of hegemony and antagonism. In short, 
they cannot think the Real/subaltern.14 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in terms of economic contradictions, internal capitalist dynamics, etc. Their violence points to an out-
side that has to be understood precisely in those terms: as subaltern outside. The fact that the spec-
trum of terrorism is being constructed by North American ideology as uncanny (as the returning re-
pressed) points to the fact that this violence is subaltern. This subalternity speaks through violence 
and thus cannot be incorporated into any political discourse of radical democracy: it highlights precise-
ly the radical limit of democracy. In many instances, subalternity exceeds political democratic repre-
sentation.  
14 In the debate between Butler, Laclau and Žižek, the latter underscores that the central issue at 
stake is the status of the Lacanian Real (Butler 308). Laclau and Mouffe, when they differentiate be-
tween hegemony and antagonism, they do not point out that every subject and discourse involved in 
the articulation of hegemony in antagonism is part of the symbolic order (they are all effects of political 
referents, to use Lacan’s definition of the subject), whereas the Real is the internal limit of the symbol-
ic order which, nevertheless, is always outside and thus cannot be symbolized (it is not a referent). As 
Laclau and Mouffe construct antagonism, all subjects remain within the symbolic order and, thus, fore-
close the exteriority of the Real, which, politically speaking would be subalternity. In Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse, the symbolic order can be equated with capitalism, hence the foreclosure of the 
Real. This point is made even clearer in Laclau’s Emancipation(s) (36-46). 
In his later On Populist Reason, Laclau does theorize the Real, following Copjec and Alenka Zupancic, 
but he ends up focusing on the impossible jouissance that defines the Real as the original union of 
child and mother (112-115). He does not elaborate the symbolic violence involved in keeping the 
traumatic pull of the Real outside the symbolic order (as internal limit of an unsymbolizable outside).  
Alberto Moreiras, in his article on the debate between Butler, Laclau and Žižek, concedes that Laclau 
is aware of the problem of subalternity/the Real:  
There is no blindness in Laclau. His refusal to think beyond hegemony’s quasi-
transcendentality and into the plane of immanence that constitutes it… subalternity… is the 
result of a carefully thought-out political and intellectual decision. [Moreiras quotes Laclau as 
choosing “finitude”]. Laclau’s insight into the necessary coupling of blindness and insight —
and that is finitude—raises rather than elides the question as to what it is that condemns the 
contingency and historicity of hegemony theory not to push its own determinations to the limit, 
where they could open onto a consistent investigation of its own presuppositions. (126-27). 
Moreiras advances a theory of the “passible remainder;” however, this theory is not fully developed 
and it is not geopolitically situated either, which points to the fact that he might be reifying the same 
problem in a more deconstructive vein.  
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3) HARDT AND NEGRI 
3.1 Biopolitics and the Globalized/Multitudinal Working Class in Empire 
 Although cut-clear genealogies are not the issue here, one can neverthe-
less observe that Hardt and Negri’s discourse and inspiration hails from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus and One Thousand Plateaus. Although, they borrow the idea 
of “biopolitics” from Foucault, the structure and style of the work, and even the use of 
biopolitics, are closer to Deleuze and Guattari’s work and their use of “desiring ma-
chines” than Foucault’s.15 As a result, more traditional Marxist issues such as he-
gemony and capital accumulation disappear from their analysis in behalf of a discur-
sive understanding of politics. Every subject occupies an equivalent position in a new 
global economic and political formation called “Empire,” which stands for the world-
wide rule of late capitalism. Hardt and Negri postulate that all subjects and their polit-
ical differences become “singular,” because of the differential position they occupy in 
the new discursive reality of biopolitics. The authors refer to this sum of biopolitical 
singularities as “multitude.” Moreover, because of the inclusive nature of this multi-
tude, their analysis does not accept any form of exteriority or subalternity in Empire.  
 As I will discuss in the following, Hardt and Negri’s discursive understanding 
of “Empire, biopolitics, and multitude” can be traced back to their unconscious geopo-
litical reliance on the (post)imperialist, European nation-state and, more specifically, 
on the state-class structure and national language, which create the biopolitical effect 
of complete interiority and differential singularity the authors claim for their theory of 
Empire. Thus, it is important first to see the way in which Hardt and Negri present 
and articulate the concepts of “Empire,” “biopolitics,” and “multitude” in order to, then, 
                                                       
15 I believe that the paradoxical distance from Foucault is due to the unacknowledged mediation of 
Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer (1996), which develops the concept of biopolitics in a way that is 
more similar to that of Hardt and Negri. Agamben is only acknowledged once in Empire, and only to 
criticize his work (366).  
 Papeles del CEIC # 21, mayo 2006 (ISSN: 1695-6494) 
Joseba Gabilondo, Global Subalternity, Exteriority, and Independence Day 
 CEIC http://www.ehu.es/CEIC/papeles/21.pdf 
 
(c) Joseba Gabilondo, 2006 
(c) CEIC, 2006, de esta edición 
 
—29— 
 
analyze the geopolitical unconscious that supports and structures their Marxist dis-
course: the (post)imperialist, European nation-state.16  
 According to Hardt and Negri’s elaboration, “Empire” constitutes the new 
economic and political form that late capitalism takes in postmodernism. It is im-
portant to note that they emphasize the transcendental ubiquitousness of Empire, 
which does not allow for any form of exteriority and, as a result, encompasses all so-
cial aspects; it includes what in traditional Marxism is considered base and super-
structure. In the words of Hardt and Negri, Empire is a “unitary machine” with no out-
side:  
Postmodernization and the passage to Empire involve a real 
convergence of the realms that used to be designated as base and 
superstructure. Empire takes form when language and 
communication, or really when immaterial labor and cooperation, 
become the dominant productive force… The superstructure is put 
to work, and the universe we live in is a universe of productive 
linguistic networks. The lines of production and those of 
representation cross and mix in the same linguistic and productive 
realm… Production becomes indistinguishable from reproduction… 
Social subjects are at the same time producers and products of this 
unitary machine. In this new historical formation it is thus no longer 
possible to identify as a sign, a subject, a value, or a practice that is 
“outside.” (385) 
 Finally, it is important to underline that, according to Hardt and Negri, every-
thing is connected in Empire because of the new linguistic and communicative turn 
taken by production and capital.  
 In this context, the theorization of biopolitics becomes crucial for the au-
thors, since capitalist production and consumption merge with bodies, so that the lat-
ter become “producers and products of this unitary machine.” Hardt and Negri con-
tend that this fusion is the basis for their deployment of “biopolitics.” Therefore, it is 
                                                       
16 Given the length of this article, I have not included the monograph on Empire edited by the journal 
Rethinking Marxism 13.3/4 (2001). A longer version of this article will include the monograph. 
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important to underscore that, unlike the work of authors such as Immanuel Waller-
stein, the work of Hardt and Negri does not make room for geopolitics; it only con-
cerns itself with biopolitics. Furthermore, because of their lack of a geopolitical theori-
zation, the two authors contend that biopolitics has ontological repercussions; it be-
comes the ultimate horizon of being and doing in late capitalism: 
When our analysis is firmly situated in the biopolitical world where 
social, economic, and political production and reproduction coincide, 
the ontological perspective and the anthropological perspective tend 
to overlap… The biopolitical world is an inexhaustible weaving 
together of generative actions, of which the collective (as meeting 
point of singularities) is the motor… Generation, that first fact of 
metaphysics, ontology, and anthropology, is a collective mechanism 
or apparatus of desire. Biopolitical becoming celebrates this “first” 
dimension in absolute terms. (388, my emphasis) 
 Hardt and Negri complete their description of Empire by concluding that the 
ontological result of this new biopolitical “becoming” is the formation of “the multi-
tude,” which, according to them, becomes the new central subject of politics in Em-
pire. The multitude is constituted by the re-productive interaction of every subject 
who, because of its biopolitical location within Empire, is always a singularity that 
cannot be reduced to the nation, the people, the masses, or any other collective sub-
jectivity. Moreover, Empire is only reactive to the biopolitical thrust of the multitude: 
Producing and reproducing autonomously mean constructing a new 
ontological reality. In effect, by working, the multitude produces itself 
as singularity. It is a singularity that establishes a new place in the 
non-place of Empire, a singularity that is a reality produced by 
cooperation, represented by the linguistic community, and 
developed by the movements of hybridization… Standing the 
ideology of the market on its feet, the multitude promotes through its 
labor the biopolitical singularizations of groups and sets of humanity, 
across each and every node of global interchange. (395, my 
emphasis) 
 It is important to emphasize that, for Hardt and Negri, the singularizing work 
of the multitude does not contradict the logic of capitalism but expands it, since sin-
gularization is an effect of the multitude’s labor. At the same time, although singulari-
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zation implies non-interchangeability, it also entails equivalence in the biopolitical 
grid: every subject in Empire constitutes a non-hierarchical point that participates 
equally in the formation of the multitude and its political potential for revolution. Ulti-
mately, every subject represents biopolitical “homogeneity” in singularization; it is 
“homogeneously” singular. At no point in their book do Hardt and Negri address the 
issue of hierarchy, inequality, geopolitics or power differences within the multitude. Or 
as Laclau adds in a more technical way, their work does not present an ideological 
articulation and, thus, there is no room for antagonism (“Can Immanence” 26). As the 
reference to language in the above quote already shows (“represented by the linguis-
tic community”) and, as I will argue below, the latent paradigm of Hardt and Negri’s 
multitude is “discourse as grid of referents” or, more specifically, “discourse as na-
tional language:” a single discursive structure constituted by differences that define 
each other syntagmatically and paradigmatically (Saussure) and are nationalistically 
shielded from the influence of other state languages and linguistic realities (invasion, 
diglossia, hybridation, extinction, etc.) by sovereign state apparatuses.  
 Finally, and following Marxism’s utopian and teleological impulse, Hardt and 
Negri also propose that the multitude’s political goal is to break down every limitation 
or repression imposed by capitalism in globalization, so that the former can continue 
its biopolitical expansion (“singularization of groups and sets of humanity”): 
How can the actions of the multitude become political? How can the 
multitude organize and concentrate its energies against the 
repression and incessant territorial segmentations of Empire? The 
only response that we can give to these questions is that the action 
of the multitude becomes political primarily when it begins to 
confront directly and with an adequate consciousness the central 
repressive operations of Empire. It is a matter of recognizing and 
engaging the imperial initiatives and not allowing them continually to 
reestablish order. (399) 
 This political action takes, in Hardt and Negri’s formulation, a teleological 
character that complements the multitude’s ontological being. As they clarify, “[T]he 
telos of the multitude must live and organize its political space against Empire and 
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yet within the ‘maturity of the times’ and the ontological conditions that Empire pre-
sents” (407). The authors emphasize again the teleological nature of this movement 
when they conclude, at the end of their book, that the multitude’s biopolitical self-
organization will reach its historical and political realization when the latter over-
throws Empire’s order:  
Certainly, there must be a moment when reappropriation and self-
organization reach a threshold and configure a real event. This is 
when the political is really affirmed—when the genesis is complete 
and self-valorization, the cooperative convergence of subjects, and 
the proletarian management of production become a constituent 
power. This is the point when the modern republic ceases to exist 
and the postmodern posse arises. This is the founding moment of 
an earthly city that is strong and distinct from any divine city. (411) 
 The conclusion of the book resonates with the utopian echoes of the Com-
munist Manifesto: once the historical and material conditions of capital exploitation 
are right, the new postmodern biopolitical “working class” will overthrow capitalism.  
 Yet, for Hardt and Negri, the working class no longer is an economic class. 
As a result of late capitalism’s biopolitical organization, now there is a new proletariat 
they call the multitude: a postmodern biopolitical “working class” that encompasses, 
in its biopolitical singularity, every difference, from sex and gender to race and ecolo-
gy. Yet, as Hardt and Negri acknowledge, their approach is still too conceptual and 
abstract (399). As I will elaborate in the following, this biopolitical expansion of the 
“biopolitical working class,” ultimately does not transcend the location in which the 
working class is historically formed and theorized: the (post)imperialist, European 
nation-state. 
3.2 The National Lineage of Empire’s Geopolitics 
 Hardt and Negri continue to theorize from a Marxist position that assumes 
the (post)imperialist, European nation-state, rather than globalization, as the episte-
mological and ontological horizon of politics. As they emphasize, the point of depar-
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ture to theorize biopolitics, Empire, and the multitude is class.17 However, their reli-
ance on class is complicated by the Marxist tradition from which they hail. Only from 
an unconscious acceptance of the (post)imperialist, European nation-state as politi-
cal ontological horizon, do all forms of subalternity lose their historical difference and, 
then, can be absorbed within a biopolitical horizon whose matrix remains social 
class. The nation-state, from its unconscious space, ensures that biopolitics fully co-
incides with class difference, so that any other difference becomes a biopolitical ex-
tension of class difference, on the one hand, and is thought out as derivative of such 
class difference, on the other. In this way, capitalism becomes the transcendental 
and ontological horizon that ensures the geo-biopolitical correspondence between 
class and difference. As a result, subaltern difference is eliminated by the transcen-
dental horizon of an all-encompassing capitalism still grounded on the 
(post)imperialist, European nation-state and its homogeneous class structure. In this 
way, subaltern exteriority ceases to be biopolitically visible. Only from within the 
(post)imperialist, European nation-state does the biopolitical expansion of capitalism 
create the unconscious geopolitical effect of inclusion, homogenization, and equaliza-
tion, which Hardt and Negri claim for the new multitude in Empire.18  
 In last instance, the discursive approach to biopolitical difference adopted 
by Hardt and Negri, which equalizes class and difference, relies on the unconscious 
                                                       
17 In the introduction to Empire, the authors state: “We structured the book this way in order to empha-
size the importance of the shift from the realm of ideas to that of production… We intend this shift of 
standpoint to function something like the moment in Capital when Marx invites us to leave the noisy 
sphere of exchange and descend into the hidden abode of production” (xvii). After the discussion and 
critiques on Empire, in their new book Multitude, the authors further clarify this point: “In this chapter 
we will articulate the concept of the multitude primarily from a socioeconomic perspective. Multitude is 
also a concept of race, gender, and sexuality differences. Our focus on economic class here should be 
considered in part as compensation for the relative lack of attention to class in recent years with re-
spect to these other lines of social difference and hierarchy” (100-1). Afterwards, they assert the fol-
lowing: “Multitude is a class concept” (103). 
18 Peter Fritzpatrick makes a very compelling case for the nationalist, European understanding 
showed by Hardt and Negri towards North America’s imperialism and ideological exceptionalism, 
which requires that they forget the massacre of Native Americans (43-52).  
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effect of the state’s national language. Only from within the nation-state can one 
claim that representation and politics coincide and that any politics is internal (to Em-
pire); only then is any form of politics biopolitical and multitudinal. When the authors 
state that “[T]he lines of production and those of representation cross and mix in the 
same linguistic and productive realm” (385), they assume that representation, lan-
guage, and politics coincide, so that any political difference also becomes a repre-
sentational difference—it is politically represented. Furthermore, and as a result of 
Hardt and Negri’s poststructuralist epistemology, their discursive approach further 
amplifies the above geopolitical deadlock. Only the differential nature of language 
and, more specifically, the transcendental status that language acquires in the 
(post)imperialist, European nation-state can guarantee the match between politics 
and representation. Only from within a national, linguistic, epistemological theory, 
does each subject represent its biopolitical difference in a single discursive horizon 
that is understandable to the rest of political subjects, so that every subject becomes 
a biopolitical, multitudinal singularity.  
 This transparent political positionality derives from that of the signifier in 
language, as postulated by poststructuralism, following Saussure. Hardt and Negri’s 
reliance on the poststructuralist discursive model of the signifier allows the authors to 
combine all social differences as if they constituted a single language. Through syn-
tagmatic and paradigmatic combination, all political subjects find their differential 
place within the new unitary language of biopolitics. This universal access to repre-
sentation and understandability can only take place within the (post)imperialist, Euro-
pean nation-state. As Spivak reminds us, for the subaltern subject, the lack of repre-
sentation and translation becomes the political issue itself (A Critique 198-311). 
 In short, Empire and the multitude are ontologically global and inclusive only 
if subalternity is erased from the geopolitical limit of biopolitics. Even in Hardt and 
Negri’s latest work, Multitude, Empire’s immanent interiority is posited and justified as 
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a result of capitalism’s ontological transcendence. Capitalism continues to be the all-
encompassing structure that justifies and ontologizes any singularity and history: 
No group is “disposable” because global society functions together 
as a complex, integrated whole. Imperial sovereignty thus cannot 
avoid or displace its necessary relationship with this unlimited global 
multitude. Those over whom Empire rules can be exploited—in fact, 
their social productivity must be exploited—and for this very reason 
they cannot be excluded. Empire must constantly confront the 
relationship of rule and production with the global multitude as a 
whole and face the threat it poses. (335-36)  
 My above critique can be expanded to more radical and deadlier political 
situations. AIDS and ethnic cleansing, for example, point to a deadly exteriority in 
which bodies are disposed off as a result of their subaltern position. To attempt to 
explain this exteriority in biopolitical terms is only a way to avoid the problem in its 
radical exteriority: death.  
3.3 Independence Day as the Geopolitical Exclusion of Non-Biopolitical 
Subalternity 
 A more concrete approach to a biopolitical node such as Hollywood, in 
which “language and communication” intersect with the new “immaterial labor,” will 
allow us to test the contradictions, limits, and potential of Hardt and Negri’s general 
and abstract model in a more specific way. The following analysis will concentrate on 
the film Independence Day. However, and in order to understand the new changes 
brought about by Hollywood in the geo-biopolitical organization of labor and commu-
nication, it is important, first, to exert a historical analysis of the hegemonic nodes of 
representation in the West.  
 Lukàcs theorized in his The Historical Novel that the Napoleonic wars mobi-
lized European masses in unprecedented ways: lay French people, drafted for the 
first time, found themselves at the gates of Moscow or Cádiz. As a result, the rural 
communities of these places had to mobilize themselves and react against “the inva-
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sion of modernity.” This general and massive mobilization of people, Lukàcs ex-
plains, gave rise to the formation of history, as the new form of perceiving and being 
in time: Europe had entered history as the time of open-ended events. No European 
mass or group was exempted from the historical effects of those events, unlike, say, 
in the Middle Ages. As a result, the previous cyclical rural understanding and experi-
ence of time was altogether marginalized in favor of the progressive open-ended 
one, that is, history. In turn, the formation of “history” gave rise to nationalism. Ac-
cording to Lukàcs, nationalism is a historical reaction to the cultural and economic 
differences encountered by people at war. Finally, Lukàcs explains that the “birth” of 
history and nationalism, in the early nineteenth century, is represented by and coded 
in the romantic historical novel, first, and the realist novel, later. The “middle-of-the-
road hero” present in Walter Scott’s historical novels, which condensed history into 
an individual, narrative subjective form, served Balzac to articulate the bourgeois 
subject of his realist novels. Therefore and according to Lukàcs, literary realism can 
be understood as the new symbolic order that registers, encodes, and legitimizes 
European history and its nationalist bourgeois subject. Although Lukàcs does not 
elaborate the feminist and postcolonial side of this representational history, one could 
add that nationalism relegates the domestic and colonial field to the negative space 
of non-history: the re-productive field of nature. 
 Although a more detailed account of this “history of representation” I am 
effecting here would have to incorporate modernist literature and art, as coming to-
gether with the full expansion of European imperialism at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, it will suffice to say that modernism still holds on to the representation of the 
modern subject—in the negative guise of crisis—and, thus, is a continuation of the 
modern realist tradition (Bürgher). Only after World War II, with the rise of American 
global hegemony and late capitalism, does a different type of representational econ-
omy emerge: mass culture, which is audiovisual rather than literary. Fredric Jameson 
locates in this historical moment the break between modernity and postmodernity (1-
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54). Although, in a first moment, mass culture can be understood as the national ar-
ticulation of a hegemonic, North American, middle-class subject, the Cold War and 
the Marshall plan make clear that this culture is already rooted in an imperialist 
framework of expansionism, as Hardt and Negri also acknowledge (Empire 176-82).  
 This new representational and cultural formation, i.e. audiovisual mass cul-
ture, represents a break similar to the one isolated by Lukàcs at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Although this shift begins during the Cold War, only after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, when North America gains global dominance and engages in local-
ized wars against different political enemies (Panama, Iraq, Afghanistan…), is the 
historical experience of war turned into a spectacle for the majority of spectators of 
the first world. If the Napoleonic wars “inaugurate” history, the new, global, yet local-
ized wars of the aftermath of the Cold War give raise to a new understanding and 
perception of time, which no longer follows the logic of history, but rather that of 
“spectacle.” In turn, this new perception of time brings both the end of modern history 
and the beginning of a new “spectacular time.” Let me cite the central spectacular 
war that constitutes the (arbitrary) landmark of this new reorganization of both repre-
sentation and history: the Gulf War of 1991. 
 It is well established that the Vietnam War was the first time television cov-
ered war in a systematic way. However, at that moment in television history, it took 
days to deliver the footage to the audience. In this respect, the Gulf War of 1991 rep-
resents the first time in which coverage and broadcasting became simultaneous. 
Thanks to the exclusive satellite hookup arranged by CNN, the cable audience was 
able to watch alive the Gulf War of 1991 as it unfolded in front of their eyes. Further-
more, as a result of the live satellite broadcast, cable audiences throughout the entire 
world followed the war coverage as a single audience. In other words, different na-
tional audiences no longer depended on a later broadcast made in their own different 
national times and schedules. As a result, this was the first time in history in which 
the technologically advanced world came together to watch a “real event,” as it un-
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raveled in front of its eyes—even though the Kennedy assassination and the landing 
on the moon were important precedents.  
 I want to distinguish a “real event” from a “planned event,” such as the 
Olympic Games, which take place every four years and are planned accordingly. 
Both real and planned events are spectacles but, in the former case, the open-ended 
course of unplanned events unfolds in front of an audience. The “reality” of those un-
planned events shapes and legitimizes them as worth-seeing and, in turn, gives them 
the shape of a spectacle. Although planned events such as the Olympic Games 
paved the way for the coverage of the Gulf War, the latter was the first “real event” to 
be followed simultaneously by a global audience as a spectacle.  
 Yet, the simultaneity between coverage and viewing in the case of the Gulf 
War, which in itself simply amounts to a technological advance, nevertheless brought 
about a change that exceeds the merely technological: the formation of a global au-
dience as global subject. When watching the Gulf War, the viewers knew that, as his-
tory unfolded in front of their eyes, the rest of the global audience was also watching 
the same event. In the Gulf War coverage, the idea of a global community went from 
being a simple geo-biological fact—we all live in the same planet—to becoming a 
geo-biopolitical global formation: a subject existing simultaneously in global and 
spectacular time for the first time in history. This was the first time a historical event 
was perceived by a global audience—self-aware of its own existence in space and 
time as global. The coverage of the Gulf War of 1991 marks the formation of a glob-
ally imagined community and subject. Hegel postulated that the modern man had 
substituted religious prayers with reading the newspaper in the morning.19 Anderson 
adds that reading the newspaper in the morning is one of the crucial acts involved in 
                                                       
19 “Reading the newspaper in early morning is a kind of realistic morning prayer. One orients one's 
attitude against the world and toward God [in one case], or toward that which the world is [in the oth-
er]. The former gives the same security as the latter, in that one knows where one stands” (Buck-
Morss 844). 
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imagining the nation: “What more vivid figure for the secular historically-clocked, im-
agined community can be envisioned?” (39). If we reconsider the above discussion 
on the Gulf War of 1991, we can revise Anderson’s take on Hegel and conclude that 
the act of imagining the global community takes place when a global audience 
watches war unfolding in front of its eyes.  
 If Lukàcs ciphered the beginning of history in the encounter in war of differ-
ent European people, which was not historically mobile till that point, one could es-
tablish a parallel with the Gulf War and its coverage. The simultaneous encounter of 
a global audience with itself ended modern history and gave rise to a new form of 
human temporality: imperial spectacular time, one that is not historical but rather 
chronological and genealogical. “Spectacular time” is ultimately ahistorical and relies 
on non-historical chronologies, similar to those of medieval annals (time is told ac-
cording to hegemonic genealogies, royal or otherwise; White 1-25) or even parallel to 
those of religious imperialisms, such as the Spanish.20  
 At first sight, it would appear that the above history of representation would 
reinforce Hardt and Negri’s thesis on the formation of a biopolitical global multitude—
as well as Guy Debord’s claims about the society of spectacle. The multitude could 
be understood as a global audience and subject. Furthermore, given that visual cul-
ture engages the viewer’s desire and identification and, thus, it is ultimately biopoliti-
cal, the production-articulation of spectacular time through war is in itself a form of 
labor and consumption: the North American military complex and the cable-
advertisement industry are involved and, by extension (advertisement), the entire 
commodity market as well (from The Gap to McDonalds).  
 However, this specific historization sheds a more concrete light on Hardt 
and Negri’s abstract thesis and shows its geopolitical limitations: the global viewer-
                                                       
20 I have elaborated the Lacanian and Althusserian implications of this global spectatorship elsewhere 
(“Postnationalism” 82-84).  
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ship of spectacular wars is not by any means equivalent to the whole of humanity 
and, by biopolitical extension, to “the multitude.” Only those subjects who speak or 
understand English, can afford cable, and have spare time to watch CNN, constitute 
the primary audience of spectacular war. Those other subjects, who can only watch 
their own national televisions in their own languages, constitute a second-degree of 
global spectatorship, removed one language and one degree of simultaneity from the 
core global audience. Finally, those subjects who do not own a television or cannot 
afford the time to watch it, constitute a third-degree of global spectatorship, one that 
is defined negatively by its lack of access. These latter subjects are the new subal-
tern subjects of global audiovisual culture. As the above scenario shows, globaliza-
tion does not create a biopolitical multitude of singularities without an outside. Rather 
the opposite, different groups and hierarchies are organized according to levels of 
access to and exclusion from globalization. Consequently, the resulting geopolitical 
hierarchization also creates different forms of exteriority, among which subaltern 
groups, in their extreme exteriority, are not even part of the biopolitical multitude 
and/or globalization.  
 The events of 9-11, which were originally thought out according to this new 
logic of spectacular war by the terrorists, do not constitute an exception to the above 
scenario but, rather, its intensification: now the North American subjects can watch 
themselves (first-degree of global spectatorship) as the rest of the world watches 
them being attacked by terrorists. As a result, now the rest of the world is moved to, 
at least, a second-degree of global spectatorship. Consequently, only the North 
American subjects experience globalization in its full simultaneity: they are the sub-
jects of both violence (being attacked) and representation (broadcasting/watching 
being attacked). They become the center of spectacular war and time. For example, 
the Iraqis could not watch themselves in their own national television as they were 
being bombarded by the North American air force; yet the rest of the world watched 
those same Iraqi images. The possibility of Iraqis watching themselves was a techno-
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logical impossibility generated by the breakdown of Iraqi telecommunications. Thus, 
the events of 9-11 are the final stage of this logic of spectacular war: now North 
Americans are the new subjects of globalization, whereas the rest of the world is re-
moved from this global centrality by increasing degrees of mediatic separation.  
 The above argument can be further expanded if we consider a close analy-
sis of the film Independence Day (1996). The historical reasons to choose this film 
have to do precisely with the spectacular expansion of globalization. Although the 
organization of New Hollywood can be traced back to the 60s, when classical Holly-
wood enters its crisis, it only becomes a full-blown biopolitical global formation in 
1994, when the majority of revenues from film rentals no longer originate in the North 
American domestic market but overseas. As Tino Balio states: “[B]y 1994, the over-
seas market surpassed the domestic in film rentals for the first time” (60). At that point, 
New Hollywood truly becomes globalization’s central node in charge of shaping and 
structuring desire (for consumption) and, thus, also biopolitics.21 As a result, Inde-
pendence Day (1996) is, historically speaking, the first blockbuster emerging from the 
newly globalized post-1994 New Hollywood. If you allow me an arbitrary but histori-
cally helpful claim, one could state that Independence Day is the first global film.22 
The fact that it was released few years after the first Gulf War and its plot deals with a 
North American war against a global alien, responds to the logic of spectacular war. 
                                                       
21 I am referring to New Hollywood because the latter is the informational and industrial node in which 
the desire and libido of the global masses, in so far as they are primarily viewers of North American 
mass culture, are articulated. In short, New Hollywood is the communicational node where the global 
production of information, which constitutes the immaterial labor of Empire, intersects with global de-
sire, as articulated by the biopolitical activities of narration, representation, and consumerism. New 
Hollywood produces high-tech images, global narratives, and stardom cult as audiovisual experiences 
that articulate and structure our communicational desire and pleasure. Furthermore, in so far as New 
Hollywood is able to commodify visual pleasure through different commodities (theme parks, shopping 
malls, videogames, TV programs, computer programs, etc.), it becomes the center from which the 
global desire of the masses (or multitude) is articulated. 
22 I believe that strategic essentialism (Spivak “Subaltern Studies”) is necessary when facing the con-
struction of a new global history that otherwise will be written according to the hegemonic logic of capi-
talism. 
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In short, with Independence Day, film becomes a biopolitical and libidinal experience 
for an audience that is global.23  
 From this historical approximation, a closer textual analysis of Independ-
ence Day sheds further light on the issue of the different hierarchies involved in glob-
al spectatorship as well as on the more specific problem of subaltern exclusion from 
globalization. The first third of the film is centered on a single and apparently innocu-
ous activity: watching. The different characters of the film, from the president of the 
USA to the homeless of New York, look in awe at the arrival of the huge alien ships. 
Furthermore, the highly technological detection of the aliens precedes their media 
coverage and, in turn, the media coverage precedes the physical ocular watching of 
the event. In other words, this narrative logic of technologically inverting the process 
of perceiving reality (radars > television > eye) sets the epistemological ground of the 
film: having access to a global event is directly related to its North American techno-
logical-media coverage. The further removed from the technology-media, the less 
informed and less global the subject in the film becomes. Conversely, the closer to 
coverage-simultaneity, the more global the subject turns out to be in the film. In this 
respect, the film follows the technological and institutional organization of spectacular 
war outlined above. 
                                                       
23 Furthermore, the new tailoring of national cinemas to the filmic conventions of New Hollywood, spe-
cially in Europe but also in Latin America and Asia, also shows that national cinemas are no longer 
exterior to Hollywood: they become national versions of New Hollywood’s “blockbuster” cinema. Jackie 
Chan’s success in Asia (Rumble in the Bronx, 1995) or the earlier French “cinema of the look” that 
begins with Diva (1981) and Betty Blue (1986) are milestones of this new transformation. 
At first, one could conclude that the fact that Independence Day and other later films organize global 
viewers as homogeneous and equivalent audiences of global films produced by the libidinal node of 
Empire—New Hollywood—would corroborate the abstract claim made by Hardt and Negri about Em-
pire and the biopolitical organization of the masses. Furthermore, the fact that around the same time, 
New Hollywood moves to absorb independent film—a separate practice and market till that point—
further proves Hardt and Negri’s claim. If one considers the paradigmatic boom of Tarantino’s Pulp 
Fiction (1994), which emblematically cannibalizes J.L. Godard’s cinema—the epitome of independent 
and art film—, the popularity of the Sundance Film Festival, or the launching of an independent film TV 
channel, it would appear that filmic exteriority is absorbed by New Hollywood by the mid 90s. 
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 Yet, Independence Day reveals a second way in which capitalism, globali-
zation, biopolitics, and subaltern exteriority intersect. Almost every image in the film 
has been cannibalized from previous Hollywood film and television. The list is long: 
Them!, 2001: Space Odyssey, Star Wars, Star Trek, Doctor Strangelove, E.T., Alien, 
Lawrence of Arabia, World War II films, etc. An analysis of this filmic cannibalization 
reveals a second degree of biopolitical globalization that the CNN coverage of the 
Gulf War or the events of 9-11 do not show readily. The images of Independence 
Day allowing the formation-legitimation of spectators as global subjects derive from 
Hollywood film history. As result, only Hollywood’s cultural tradition is legitimized as 
capable of enabling the process of global subject formation. That is, the cannibaliza-
tion of older Hollywood film culture, in films such as Independence Day, legitimizes 
Hollywood tradition as the only filmic history that allows the spectator to become a 
global subject.  
 Therefore a filmic memory of and desire for Hollywood are ultimately nec-
essary to legitimize any subject as global and, if we follow Hardt and Negri’s theoriza-
tion, as biopolitical. Other filmic traditions no longer count or qualify as pertinent to 
narrating or representing globalization through its core biopolitical event: spectacular 
war. Any other tradition becomes secondary or is turned into a subaltern filmic tradi-
tion, since it blocks the audience from becoming global. If this is so, once again, late 
capitalism is creating an exteriority, a subaltern exteriority to be more precise, which 
is not biopolitical. In the same way that specific technologies (such as BETA video) 
have been discarded as a result of the advance and consolidation of a globalized 
technology, other filmic or technological traditions are also being pushed outside the 
biopolitical, global circuit of production and consumption. Some of these traditions 
might be later on rescued and commodified as vintage or retro objects (nostalgia cul-
ture), but definitively not all of them, not even a majority. Any subaltern position that 
does not even have a national filmic tradition, such as the French or the Indian, but 
just a small body of films and a language that is not English, falls outside the biopolit-
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ical formation of the global multitude argued by Hardt and Negri. Although more than 
one critic might resort to hybridization (Bhabha), it is important to remember that, ac-
cording to specialists working with Unesco, “6,760 different languages are spoken in 
the world. However, 96 percent of these are spoken by only 4 percent of the world's 
population… 95 percent of all languages would disappear, or be on the brink of ex-
tinction, in the next 100 years” (Red Book). In a near future, some films might even 
lose their original linguistic audience. In short, hybridation does not account for the 
annihilation or obliteration of culture; hybridation can only account for subaltern for-
mations when all the cultures involved in hybridation are imperialistic in origin (Span-
ish, English, etc.) and their languages are not endangered. In short, a more cultural-
ecological approach to globalization proves that the biopolitical formation of the multi-
tude in Empire, as theorized by Hardt and Negri, creates an exteriority that is funda-
mental to the expansion of late capitalism.  
 It would take more space than I have here to elaborate this point, but I 
would like to claim that what I have proved above for filmic cultures and languages 
also applies to race, sex, gender, and ethnicity. If we combine the technological exte-
riority argued earlier with the cultural exteriority I have discussed here, we can con-
clude that capitalism creates forms of subalternity that are external technologically, 
culturally, or both: capitalism places some subaltern subjects outside its economy-
technology and/or culture. There are different degrees of exteriority. Theorists of 
subalternity such as Walter Mignolo clearly and vehemently argue this point—the 
existence of exteriority—precisely in order to counteract totalizing discourses such as 
Hardt and Negri’s. When Mignolo proposes “border gnosis” as a form of geopolitically 
situated knowledge, he does so in order to rescue the space of subalternity: 
 Border gnosis as knowledge from a subaltern perspective is knowledge 
conceived from the exterior borders of the modern/colonial world system, and border 
gnoseology as a discourse about colonial knowledge is conceived at the conflictive 
intersection of the knowledge produced from the perspective of modern colonialisms 
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(rhetoric, philosophy, science) and knowledge produced from the perspective of co-
lonial modernities in Asia, Africa, and the Americas/Caribbean… Finally, border gno-
seology could be contrasted with territorial gnoseology or epistemology, the philoso-
phy of knowledge, as we know it today (from Descartes, to Kant, to Husserl and all its 
ramifications in analytic philosophy of languages and philosophy of science): a con-
ception and a reflection on knowledge articulated in concert with the cohesion of na-
tional languages and the formation of the nation-state... (Local 11) 
 Hardt and Negri’s approach to the biopolitical constitution of a global mass 
or multitude overlooks the fact that, on the one hand, there are different degrees of 
biopolitical subjectivization and, on the other, there are subaltern masses defined by 
their lack of access to both biopolitics and its mediatic and/or geopolitical deploy-
ment. Non-biopolitical subalternity does not enter Hard and Negri’s equation precise-
ly because their approach centers on capitalism; they overlook the fact that there is 
an exteriority to capitalism. As many critics have pointed out, their theory is immanent 
precisely because it resorts to the transcendence of capitalism to justify its immanent 
ontology (Laclau “Can Immanence”) and teleology. As Sylvère Lotringer states in her 
foreword to Paul Virno’s work on multitude: “a multitude capable of doing such a feat 
doesn’t exist—or doesn’t exist yet… the idea that capital could simply be ‘destroyed’ 
by such an essentialist notion is a bit hard to swallow… The telos… precedes the 
multitude, and for the most part replaces it” (15). The exteriority I am defending here 
is necessary and structural to capitalism’s advance and cannot be accounted by 
Marx’s original formula of capitalist expansion, since other geopolitical factors (race, 
pre-existing political structures, the aftermath of decolonization, etc.) have to be ac-
counted. The tradition of subaltern studies departs precisely from this assumption 
(Gramsci, Guha): what Marx denominated “lumpenproletariat” is not simply a negligi-
ble excess, but rather the condition that points to an exteriority that exceeds capital-
ism and turns such an exteriority into the foundation of a non-capitalist historicity. 
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 One could argue that the logic of capitalism will continue to expand and ab-
sorb these forms of global subalternity; but that is not the case. Let us say, for the 
sake of argument, that every subject/family/group in Africa24 will some day have a 
television set and a satellite-cable hookup.25 However, this capitalist-centered logic 
overlooks the fact that different groups in Africa already have different technological 
cultures based on oral traditions (and radio) and, thus, the fact that they are subaltern 
is not defined by their lack of cultural technology—oral culture—but rather by the fact 
that their technology is subaltern—exterior—vis-à-vis capitalist, audiovisual culture. 
Therefore, and although it would take more space than I have here to prove this 
point, I would like to postulate that, by the time the majority of groups and states in 
Africa acquire audiovisual TV-culture (if that ever happens at all), this culture, just like 
oral culture today, will remain subaltern vis-à-vis newer developments in global capi-
talism—namely, and for the time being, computers.26 That is, the non-biopolitical ex-
terior—the subject formations involved in this exterior position—are not defined by 
lack of technology or commodification, but rather by the subaltern status of such 
technology, which at that point, stops being biopolitical. Hardt and Negri’s biopolitics 
absorbs all masses in Empire as if they were democratically reified and commodified 
by capitalism and, thus, were able to join in a biopolitical, multitudinal revolution to 
overthrow Empire. Yet, capitalism always creates its own exteriority, that is, subalter-
nity. Empire does not create a biopolitical multitude that is equivalent and homoge-
neous in its biopolitical particularity so that, eventually, it includes all subjects in the 
                                                       
24 Here I do not mention Africa in some new form of subalternizing Orientalist fashion. I depart from 
the fact that the film Independence Day itself uses Africa to signify the Real, the exterior. 
25 “The low penetration of television can be attributed to poverty, to the lack of electric links, to poor 
transmission conditions and to the high cost of television sets. It is estimated that, in 1997, there were 
67 million television sets in Sub-Saharan Africa (not including South Africa). There were 18.5 million of 
them in 1975 and 43 million in 1985.” (Wedell and Tudesq). 
26 Kevin C. Dunn makes a similar case for politics in Africa, where he explains that the formation of 
states does not explain local politics, which are exterior to the state, capitalism, and biopolitics.  
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world, as Hardt and Negri would have it.27 Biopolitics always requires a geopolitical 
reconsideration. 
4) TO CONCLUDE 
 Only a new historization of globalization, which does not unconsciously rely 
on the (post)imperialist, European nation-state and its lack of non-economic differ-
ences as the final horizon of politics, will allow us to understand the implications of 
biopolitics and globalization. This theory will first and foremost have to account for 
the different forms of exterior subalternity and difference that globalization and late 
capitalism perpetuate or create, as I have demonstrated in the case of representa-
tion, film, and Hollywood. My attempt to rescue subalternity and exteriority are central 
to a new understanding of politics in globalization, since such an exteriority is the site 
from which globalization can be thought otherwise, challenged, subverted, and over-
come historically, without relapsing in the (post)imperialist, European nation-state. 
The member of the Subaltern Studies Group, Dipesh Chakrabarty, has already called 
for “provincializing Europe.” My discussion of the above theories responds precisely 
to this subaltern-studies drive to locate geopolitically any “European” discourse. As of 
now, we are still looking at modernity from the epistemological and geopolitical point 
of view provided by a Europe that no longer is hegemonic. It is time we incorporate 
                                                       
27 Even in Multitude, their next work, they still hypothesize a multitude without exteriority:  
This first multitude is ontological and we could not conceive our social being without it. The ot-
her is the historical multitude or, really, the not-yet multitude. This multitude has never yet 
existed. We have been tracking in part 2 the emergence of the cultural, legal, economic, and 
political conditions that make the multitude possible today. This second multitude is political, 
and it will require a political project to bring it into being on the basis of these emerging condi-
tions. These two multitudes, however, although conceptually distinct, are not really separable. 
If the multitude were not already latent and implicit in our social being, we could not even ima-
gine it as a political project; and, similarly, we can only hope to realize it today because it al-
ready exists as a real potential. The multitude, then, when we put these two together, has a 
strange, double temporality: always-already and not-yet. (221-22) 
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other points of view and generate new theories that can account for exteriority and 
subalternity as the central place from which to think politics, history and globalization. 
 If we theorized globalization from the exteriority of any subaltern group left 
outside the expansion of capitalism, the very same concepts of work, politics, circula-
tion, and identity would change. As a result, new forms of subjectivity could emerge 
across the capitalist divide—outside and inside. This geopolitically situated thinking 
exceeds capitalism while making it impossible to be absorbed by the latter. Here, I 
have only hinted to a starting point for such a task: to denounce poststructuralist ge-
opolitical reliance on the nationalist and linguistic tenets legitimized by the 
(post)imperialist, European nation-state. A geopolitically situated thinking would even 
change the problem of contingency, hegemony, and universality, and thus produce a 
more global, yet more situated knowledge, outside provincial Europe. 
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